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This article considers the institutional position of the Commission within the European citizens' initiative (ECI)
process, with particular emphasis on its decision regarding the admissibility/registration of a proposed ECI, and
its final decision on the outcome of an ECI which has met the necessary levels of support. The purpose of this
contribution is to juxtapose the case‐law of the Court on the Commission's discretion and the relevant provisions
of the Treaties with the evolution of European integration and, more specifically, the evolution of the
Commission's role therein. Viewed under this prism, the Commission's powers at the registration stage (which
in any event clearly fall under the scope of judicial review) are compatible with the constitutionalisation of the
Union, whereas the Commission's width of discretion at the follow‐up stage, while compatible with the
Commission's prerogatives, cannot easily be reconciled, nonetheless, with the Commission's limited legitimacy
when compared to that of the co‐legislators, the fact that it may not always represent the Union interest, and
the latter's pragmatic losses within the EU institutional balance.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Even the most optimistic proponents of participatory democracy in the European Union (EU) would probably hesitate to
claim that the European citizens' initiative (ECI), including its Regulation,1 has generally been a success. The ECI has
been criticised on various grounds, including the following: the procedure is unnecessarily complicated and- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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1Regulation (EU) no. 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens' initiative, OJ L 65
(hereinafter the ‘ECI Regulation’ or ‘Regulation’).
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VOGIATZIS 251formalistic;2 the Commission's faculty to reject a proposal supported by at least one million citizens should be
reconsidered;3 an ECI both procedurally complex and simultaneously non‐binding to the Commission cannot
increase the EU's democratic credentials;4 the exclusion of EU residents from supporting an ECI may give rise to
problems of consistency;5 further on the procedural complexities, the ECI Regulation appears to ‘penalise’ certain
categories of EU nationals exercising free movement and residence rights.6 To that end, a Resolution was adopted
by the European Parliament in 2015 inviting the Commission to simplify the ECI process.7 Despite its initial hesita-
tion to amend the Regulation in 2016,8 more recently the Commission has launched an online consultation with a
view to receiving feedback on possible amendments to the Regulation.9
The ECI clearly operates under the overall aegis of the Commission. More specifically, the latter has to make two
crucial decisions that will determine the ‘life’ of a proposed ECI. First, the decision as to whether or not it will register
the initiative (what may otherwise be called the ‘admissibility stage’),10 further to which the collection of signatures
begins, and the decision as to whether or not it will forward the proposals of a successful ECI campaign to the EU
legislature (the ‘follow‐up stage’).11
Regarding the above‐mentioned two steps in the ECI process, so far the criticism has primarily centred on the
Commission's stance during the admissibility stage: many perhaps would favour a more relaxed approach, on the part
of the Commission, when deciding on the registration of the proposal.12 This article takes a different approach. By jux-
taposing the provisions of theTreaties and relevant case‐lawwith the evolution of European integration and, more spe-
cifically, the evolution of the institutional position of the Commission, the article argues, first, that the Commission's
control during the admissibility stage is necessary, compatible with the progressive constitutionalisation of the Union's
legal order and in any event judicially reviewable; and second, that if the Commission's width of discretion at the final
stage of the ECI is viewed from the perspective of the evolution of the Commission's position within the EU architec-
ture, then such discretion cannot be easily reconciled with the Commission's limited (perceived) legitimacy, the fact
that the latter may not always represent the Union interest, and the shift in the dynamics of the relevant actors within
the decision‐making process. Thus, a claim is advanced towards the end of this contribution that attention should now
focus on the desirable ambit of discretion that the Commission should enjoy at the follow‐up stage, namely when
deciding on how to proceed with an otherwise successful, in terms of collection of signatures, ECI.
In this context, the article touches upon further preferences of constitutional nature and institutional design, which
may well extend beyond the ECI process as such: indeed, to what extent should the EU legislative process be ‘disrupted’
by instruments such as the ECI, and, more generally, how far citizens' views should be given due consideration? Regarding
the Commission's final decision, to what extent is it constitutionally, but also politically, appropriate to qualify the
Commission's legislative prerogative? The above issues necessitate an examination as to whether the Commission's2European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘Implementation of the European Citizens’ Initiative: The Experience of the First Three
Years', European Implementation Assessment, PE 536.343 (2015).
3Miguel Sousa Ferro, ‘Popular Legislative Initiative in the EU: Alea Iacta Est’ (2007) 26 Yearbook of European Law, 355.
4Nikos Vogiatzis, ‘Is the European Citizens’ Initiative a Serious Threat for the Community Method?’ (2013) 6 European Journal of Legal
Studies, 90.
5Michael Dougan, ‘What AreWe to Make of the Citizens’ Initiative?’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review, 1807, at 1821–1822, with
reference to the case‐law regarding the right of certain third country nationals to vote for the European elections.
6Ibid., at 1827–1828.
7European Parliament Resolution of 28 October 2015 on the European Citizens' Initiative (2014/2257(INI)).
8See ‘Commission unlikely to revise ECI Regulation this year’ (2016), available at: www.citizens‐initiative.eu/commission‐unlikely‐to‐
revise‐eci‐regulation‐this‐year/.
9See ‘Public consultation on the European citizens’ initiative’, available at: ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/public‐consultation‐euro-
pean‐citizens‐initiative_en#about‐this‐consultation.
10See Art. 4(2) of Regulation.
11See Art. 10(1)(c) of Regulation.
12Cf., e.g., European Parliamentary Research Service, above, n. 2; European Parliament Resolution, above, n. 7.
252 VOGIATZISdiscretion at both stages should be controlled judicially, quasi‐judicially or politically.13 In accordance with the above‐
mentioned scope of the article, claims related to the Commission's legitimacy, its defence of the Union interest,
and the shifting dynamics within the institutional balance suggesting the weakening of the Commission's influ-
ence, as well as the constitutionalisation of the EU legal order, will be discussed. Prior to this, the Commission's
discretion under EU law, with a particular emphasis on its right to initiate legislation, is presented.2 | THE COMMISSION 'S DISCRETION WHEN INITIATING LEGISLATION:
THE VIEW FROM THE TREATIES AND THE CASE‐LAW OF THE CJEU
Obvious reasons pertain to the discussion of this fundamental aspect of the Commission's institutional activity as it is
clear that the power to initiate legislation is closely related, if not potentially affected, by the ECI. This monopoly of the
Commission is safeguarded by theTreaties;14 that provision should be read alongside Article 17(1) TEU, which states
that the Commission serves and promotes the Union interest.15 The breadth of the Commission's prerogative has been
confirmed by well‐established case‐law. By doing so, the Court has sought to secure the Commission's independence
and, consequently, to remain as faithful as possible to the principle of institutional balance.16 Delays of two decades to
enable the formation of a common position were justified under the Commission's wide discretion and could not give
rise to action for damages.17 Accordingly, the motion of censure may not be used by Parliament as a threat to force the
Commission to submit a legislative proposal as this would undermine the Commission's independence.18
Simultaneously, Article 293(2) TFEU grants the Commission the right to amend its proposal as long as the Council
has not acted (the first paragraph of the same Article grants the Council the power to amend the proposal by unanim-
ity). In a case which received considerable attention, the Council contested the Commission's discretion to withdraw a
proposal—in cases other than when the proposal becomes obsolete or when new circumstances or data has emerged
or when clearly the prospects of a successful adoption of the proposed instrument are limited—arguing that this prac-
tice infringes the principle of institutional balance.19 The Court confirmed that the Commission's legislative preroga-
tive indeed extends to the power to withdraw the proposal, but in that case the Commission has to provide its reasons
to the Council and the European Parliament (but including during the Council's working groups or during the tripartite
meetings between the Parliament, the Council and the Commission).20 What the Court essentially left unaddressed
was the Commission's power to withdraw the proposal after the first reading.2113Due to space limitations, the notion of discretion (generally, but also under EU law) cannot be discussed here, but see, e.g., Sacha
Prechal and Bert van Roermund (eds.), The Coherence of EU Law: The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts (Oxford University Press,
2008), Part III (chapters 8–14).
14See Art. 17(2) TEU: ‘Union legislative acts may only be adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where theTreaties provide
otherwise.’ The exemptions primarily concern the Common Foreign and Security Policy, where the Commission cannot propose legislation,
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, where this right is shared with one quarter of Member States.
15Art. 17(1) TEU states that the Commission ‘shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that
end. It shall ensure the application of theTreaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to theTreaties. It shall oversee
the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union.’
16On which see, e.g., Jean‐Paul Jacqué, ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review, 383; Case C‐70/
88, European Parliament v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1990:217, para. 22. The principle is now enshrined under Art. 13(2) TEU.
17T‐571/93, Lefebvre frères et soeurs v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1995:163, in particular paras. 37–39.
18See Koen Lenaerts, ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community’ (1991) 28 Common Market Law
Review, 11, at 24–25, referring by analogy to European Parliament v. Council, above, n. 16, para. 19.
19Case C‐409/13, Council v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2015:217. See, further, Steve Peers, ‘The Commission's Power of Initiative: The
CJEU Sets Important Constraints’ (2015), available at: eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2015/04/the‐commissions‐power‐of‐initiative.html;
Merijn Chamon, ‘Upholding the “Community Method”: Limits to the Commission's Power to Withdraw Legislative Proposals—Council
v. Commission (Case C‐409/13)’ (2015) 40 European Law Review, 895.
20Council v. Commission, above, n. 19, paras. 63–109.
21Chamon, above, n. 19, at 901.
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posals for consideration to the Commission. The Commission is not obliged to accept the proposal, but if it remains
inactive, it should provide reasons.22 An inter‐institutional agreement between the European Parliament and the
Commission suggests that the latter takes the reason‐giving requirement seriously: it commits itself ‘to report[ing]
on the concrete follow‐up of any request to submit a proposal pursuant to Article 225 TFEU … within 3 months …
If the Commission does not submit a proposal, it shall give Parliament detailed explanations of the reasons’.23
Albeit a power that is different in nature, yet one also associated with the Commission's role to represent or
defend the Union interest, the latter observes the uniform application of Union law across the Member States as
the ‘guardian of the Treaties’. If the Commission believes that a Member State has not fulfilled its obligations, it
may bring the case before the CJEU.24 The infringement procedure is generally characterised by secrecy, whereby
the Commission and the Member State allegedly in violation of EU law negotiate the best feasible outcome and evade,
if possible, the intervention of the CJEU.25 Simultaneously, the CJEU's case‐law on the Commission's decision‐making
during the administrative stage clearly points to the conclusion that the latter's decisions are ‘not amenable to judicial
review’, thus confirming their ‘political nature’.26 To that end, the Court has affirmed that the Commission alone should
decide on whether (and when) an action against a Member State should be initiated and/or (subsequently) be brought
before the Court.27 The Commission's ‘rigour (or lack thereof) in its responses to alleged violations in different policy
areas’ may be informed by ‘policy considerations and priorities’, as well as by a possible calculation of the CJEU's
response.28 The Commission may take into account effectiveness or efficiency concerns or even consider that, by ini-
tiating the procedure, enforcement could essentially be undermined by the possible demonstration of some sort of
mistrust vis‐à‐vis the national judiciary.29 The scope of the Commission's discretion in the infraction process is
returned to below, where it is examined to what extent the European Ombudsman may rely on his or her approach
in this area with a view to confining the Commission's discretion at the follow‐up stage of the ECI process.3 | THE INSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE COMMISSION AGAINST THE
EVOLUTION OF THE UNION
3.1 | In search of legitimacy
As is well known, the delegation of powers to non‐representative institutions serves multiple purposes, including
expertise, credibility of policy commitments, reduced costs, avoiding blame or shifting responsibility for policy failure,22See Arts. 225 and 241 TFEU.
23Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission [2010] OJ L 304/47, point 16.
24Art. 258 TFEU.
25Melanie Smith, ‘Enforcement, Monitoring, Verification, Outsourcing: The Decline and Decline of the Infringement Process’ (2008) 33
European Law Review, 777, at 779 et seq. It has been argued, however, that after 2002 the Commission has improved the transparency
of the infringement procedure; see Luca Prete and Ben Smulders, ‘The Coming of Age of Infringement Proceedings’ (2010) 47 Common
Market Law Review, 9.
26Smith, above, n. 25, at 784.
27See, e.g., Case 7/71, Commission v. France, ECLI:EU:C:1971:121; Case C‐87/89, Sonito v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1990:213, paras. 6–
7; Case C‐431/92, Commission v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1995:260, para. 22; Case C‐471/98, Commission v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:
C:2002:628, para. 39; Case C‐476/98, Commission v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2002:631, para. 38; Joined Cases C‐20/01 and C‐28/01,
Commission v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2003:220, para. 30; C‐76/08, Commission v. Malta, ECLI:EU:C:2009:535, para. 23. As Prete and
Smulders (above, n. 25, at 16) observe, with reference to Case C‐523/04, Commission v. Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2007:244, the exces-
sive duration of infringement proceedings may be problematic only if the Member State can prove that its rights of defence have been
compromised.
28Maria Mendrinou, ‘Non‐Compliance and the European Commission's Role in Integration’ (1996) 3 Journal of European Public
Policy, 1, at 9.
29A.C. Evans, ‘The Enforcement Procedure of Article 169 EEC: Commission Discretion’ (1979) 4 European Law Review, 442, at 456.
254 VOGIATZISamong others.30 Such thoughts (effectively underpinning considerations of effectiveness and efficiency) prompted
Monnet's design of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, which later on became the European
Commission. Thus, technocratic expertise and step‐by‐step integration (which included the Commission's right of
initiative) would achieve the goals of ‘European unity’ and ‘economic prosperity’ and, through this, legitimacy.31
Especially post‐Maastricht, however, the Commission's prerogatives are increasingly being criticised on the basis of
its limited legitimacy and the need to secure diversity, the division of competences, the Commission's insufficient
accountability or responsiveness to citizens, and, ultimately, the shift of the aims of European integration from the
establishment of an internal market to the creation of an ‘ever closer Union’.32 It is therefore arguable that the Lisbon
Treaty echoes such concerns when referring to the EU's dual channel of legitimacy33 and to participatory
democracy.34 Further, the new procedure for the election of the Commission President under Article 17(7) TEU
contributes, somewhat, to the legitimacy35 of that institution.3.2 | Pragmatic losses within the EU institutional balance
As already mentioned, a particular feature of European integration (and of the Community method36) is the Commission's
prerogative to initiate the legislative process. To understand the Commission's prerogative in absolute terms, however, is
largely an illusion: the Commission is under pressure (and increasingly so) by the European Council and the Council to submit
proposals, to the pointwhere the former is not left withmuch room formanoeuvre.37 Studies have shown that the legislative
process can become ‘Council‐centric’.38 Thus, the Commission's legislative prerogative has been transformed from a right of
initiative into the privilege of being a ‘veto‐player’, a ‘gate keeper’ or even an ‘honest broker’.39 Even the gate‐keeping thesis is
compromised by the fact that the Commission will rarely reject a proposal from the intergovernmental institutions.40
These developments have been captured by ‘new intergovernmentalist’ accounts. During the crisis, in particular,
this new form of intergovernmentalism has taken a ‘deliberative dimension’ as ‘collective policy responses’ are not
assigned to supranational institutions, but are decided on the basis of elite‐driven deliberations.41 In this context,30See, e.g., Giandomenico Majone, ‘The Regulatory State and Its Legitimacy Problems’ (1999) 22 West European Politics, 1.
31See Myrto Tsakatika, ‘Claims to Legitimacy: The European Commission between Continuity and Change’ (2005) 43 Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies, 193, at 196–199.
32Ibid., at 200–203.
33Art. 10(2) TEU. This ‘dual channel’ consists of the national elections and the formation of the Council/ European Council, and the
European elections and the direct representation at the European Parliament.
34Arts. 10(3) and 11 TEU.
35See, e.g., Desmond Dinan, ‘Governance and Institutions: A More Political Commission’ (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market Studies
(Annual Review), 101, at 103, 113–114.
36On which see, generally, Renaud Dehousse (ed.), The Community Method: Obstinate or Obsolete? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
37See Paolo Ponzano, Costanza Hermanin and Daniela Corona, The Power of Initiative of the European Commission: A Progressive Erosion?
(Notre Europe, 2012); Jean‐Paul Jacqué, ‘Lost in Transition: The European Commission between Intergovernmentalism and Integra-
tion’, in D. Ritleng (ed.), Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2016),
15, at 33 et seq; Mark Dawson and Floris deWitte, ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro‐crisis’ (2013) 76Modern Law Review,
817. Others propose a joint agenda‐setting practice; nonetheless, in response to crises the European Council is more likely to act as
principal and the Commission as agent: see Pierre Bocquillon and Mathias Dobbels, ‘An Elephant on the 13th Floor of the Berlaymont?
European Council and Commission Relations in Legislative Agenda Setting’ (2014) 21 Journal of European Public Policy, 20.
38Robert Thomson and Madeleine Hosli, ‘Who Has Power in the EU? The Commission, Council and Parliament in Legislative Decision‐
Making’ (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies, 391.
39See, generally, Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 72–
73; John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, The Institutions of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2012), at 120.
40Ponzano et al., above, n. 37; see also Stefanie Bailer, ‘An Agent Dependent on the EU Member States? The Determinants of the
European Commission's Legislative Success in the European Union’ (2014) 36 Journal of European Integration, 37.
41Uwe Puetter, ‘Europe's Deliberative Intergovernmentalism: The Role of the Council and European Council in EU Economic Gover-
nance’ (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy, 161.
VOGIATZIS 255the ‘centre of new intergovernmentalism’, the European Council, ‘regularly deal[s] with detailed policy decisions and
no longer focus[es] predominantly on providing political guidance’; simultaneously, the Commission ‘as a traditional
supranational actor is not hard‐wired for the pursuit of ever closer Union according to the model of the classic
Community method’.423.3 | Representing the ‘Union interest’?
The foundation of the Commission's monopoly to initiate legislation and its independence43 is the tenet that it acts on
behalf of the Union interest as a supranational institution. The Commission believes that it is legitimised to represent
the Union interest44 for two main reasons: it is impartial and neutral vis‐à‐vis the positions of Member States (the role
of mediator); and it possesses expert knowledge that stems from input received by various stakeholders.45 It is ques-
tionable, nonetheless, whether the Commission (the College itself or the administration working for the Commission) is
always acting on behalf of the Union interest, thereby keeping intact its institutional independence primarily from
Member States.46 The pursuit of careers at the domestic level before or after service at the Commission, the control
via comitology,47 or instances where Commission decisions appear to ‘[privilege] home country rules’,48 point to the
fragility of the thesis that the Commission by definition always represents the Union interest. To return to decision‐
making, it is equally questionable whether the widely endorsed practice of ‘trilogues’49 (informal meetings between
representatives from the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council aiming at reaching an agreement on
forthcoming legislation) fits comfortably into the Commission's required neutrality as representative of the Union
interest. True, such developments might increase the efficiency of the ‘conciliation’ process introduced by the Maas-
tricht Treaty,50 but the extent of the use of trilogues raises concerns not only on transparency grounds,51 but also
on grounds of identifying the nature of representation at the EU decision‐making level.3.4 | The constitutionalisation of the Union
The progressive constitutionalisation of the EU requires little elaboration. Owing to well‐known case‐law and various
treaty revisions, it is now common to talk about an autonomous legal order (no doubt a concept the CJEU is often too42Uwe Puetter, ‘The European Council: The Centre of New Intergovernmentalism’, in Christopher Bickerton, Dermot Hodson and Uwe
Puetter (eds.), The New Intergovernmentalism: States and Supranational Actors in the Post‐Maastricht Era (Oxford University Press,
2015), 165, at 182.
43See now Art. 245 TFEU.
44While being a heterogeneous and increasingly politicised bureaucracy, as many have observed; see, e.g., Thomas Christiansen, ‘Ten-
sions of European Governance: Politicised Bureaucracy and Multiple Accountability in the European Commission’ (1997) 4 Journal of
European Public Policy, 73.
45Tsakatika, above, n. 31, at 199–200.
46See, e.g., Liesbet Hooge, ‘Images of Europe: How Commission Officials Conceive their Institution's Role’ (2012) 50 Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies, 87; Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, ‘EU Member States and the Prodi Commission’, in Dionyssis
Dimitrakopoulos (ed.), The Changing European Commission (Manchester University Press, 2004), at 89.
47Christiansen, above, n. 44, at 83–85.
48Vivien Schmidt, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and “Throughput”’ (2013) 61 Political
Studies, 2, at 11, with reference to the Commission's services initiative.
49For a more general discussion, see, among others, Christilla Roederer‐Rynning and Justin Greenwood, ‘The Culture of Trilogues’
(2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy, 1148; Christine Reh, ‘Is Informal Politics Undemocratic? Trilogues, Early Agreements
and the Selection Model of Representation’ (2014) 21 Journal of European Public Policy, 822.
50Roederer‐Rynning and Greenwood, above, n. 49, at 1149.
51On this point, see the EuropeanOmbudsman's own‐initiative inquiry on the transparency of ‘trilogue’meetings: CaseOI/8/2015/JAS.
256 VOGIATZISkeen to rehearse52) with its own, particular, constitutional architecture. Adherence to the EU rule of law,53 principles
such as proportionality, subsidiarity, and effective judicial protection, the classification of competences, a legally bind-
ing Charter of Fundamental Rights, are familiar developments. The increase in Union competence does not signify an
augmentation in the powers of the supranational Commission: the latter increasingly needs to rely on national author-
ities since most of the competences are either shared or complementary, it lacks financial and administrative
resources for effective supervision, and also takes into account the regulatory and administrative idiosyncrasies of
the Member States.54 Overall, the conception of the Commission as the ‘guardian of the Treaties’ is compatible with
(if not closely associated with) the constitutionalisation of the EU legal order.
This section assessed the position of the Commission in the broader institutional, political, and constitutional EU
framework. Quite evidently, the text of the Treaties does not always accord with institutional practice. This point is
returned to below; it is now appropriate to explore the precise role of the Commission in the ECI process.4 | THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION UNDER THE ECI REGULATION:
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
Before the commencement of the collection of signatures stemming from at least one quarter of Member States,55
the organisers should submit their proposal (i.e., the subject matter and the objectives of the proposed ECI) to the
Commission for approval; this is the registration or admissibility stage.56 The Commission will refuse registration only
under one of the following four conditions: the contact persons and the citizens' committee have not been formed;
the proposal ‘manifestly fall[s] outside the framework of the Commission's powers to submit a proposal for a legal
act of the Union’; the ECI is ‘manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious’; and the proposal is against Article 2 TEU
and the EU's values.57 Importantly, if the Commission refuses to register the initiative, beyond providing its reasons,
it has the additional obligation to inform organisers of the available remedies, notably the possibility to initiate court
proceedings against the Commission or to submit a complaint to the European Ombudsman.58
Article 10 of the Regulation effectively stipulates that after the successful collection of signatures and the verifi-
cation by Member State authorities, the Commission is not bound to accept the content of a proposed ECI, but should
publish in a communication ‘its legal and political conclusions’ and ‘the action it intends to take, if any, and its reasons
for taking or not taking that action.’Within the realm of the Commission's duties during this second stage falls an obli-
gation to meet with the organisers so that they explain the aims of the ECI,59 and work with the European Parliament
so that a public hearing be organised at the premises of the latter, with the participation of the Commission, the orga-
nisers and other EU institutions and bodies of the Union wishing to be involved.60 The Commission has committed52See, e.g., the widely criticised CJEU's Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, on the compatibility of the Draft Agreement on the EU
accession to the ECHR with Union law.
53For an account inviting the Commission to be more active in the enforcement of the rule of law, see Dimitry Kochenov and
Laurent Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional
Law Review, 512.
54Giandomenico Majone, ‘The European Commission: The Limits of Centralisation and the Perils of Parliamentarisation’ (2002) 15
Governance, 375, at 380–383.
55Art. 2(1) of Regulation. According to Art. 3, the signatories and the organisers of the ECI should be Union citizens.
56Art. 4 of Regulation. For further discussion, see Anastasia Karatzia, ‘The European Citizens’ Initiative in Practice: Legal Admissi-
bility Concerns' (2015) 40 European Law Review, 509; James Organ, ‘Decommissioning Direct Democracy? A Critical Analysis of
Commission Decision‐Making on the Legal Admissibility of European Citizens’ Initiative Proposals' (2014) 10 European Constitu-
tional Law Review, 422.
57See Arts. 4(2)(a)–(d) of Regulation.
58See Art. 4(3) of Regulation.
59Art. 10(1)(b) of Regulation.
60Art. 11 of Regulation.
VOGIATZIS 257itself ‘to a close and early cooperation with Parliament on any legislative initiative requests emanating from citizens’
initiatives'.61
The margin of discretion that the Commission enjoys during the two aforementioned stages varies considerably.
The common element (and perhaps the only one) is the explicit obligation to provide reasons. However, at the regis-
tration stage the Commission is essentially bound to register the ECI unless there is a procedural error, lack of Union
competence or deviation from the Union's values. There is no doubt that an assessment of this sort may entail some
degree of discretion: for example, the values of the Union are broadly construed, providing the Union courts, as well
as the EU legislature, with broader directions as to the interpretation of legislation or the general objectives that need
to be pursued by Union action.62 More generally, as Dougan observed, the danger at the admissibility/registration
stage is this: ‘[I]f certain essentially political questions about the desirability of a given proposal are cast instead as
legal issues concerning its admissibility for registration, the Commission's influence over the agenda‐setting potential
of the new [E]CI system is potentially both enlarged and shielded from public view.’63
In any case, the reference in the Regulation to the Commission's obligation to inform organisers of judicial and
extra‐judicial remedies evidences that the decision on registration is subject to review, including when the Commis-
sion assesses the competence question or the compatibility with the Union's values. This point is returned to in the
next section. The same cannot be claimed with regard to the Commission's final decision; here, the Regulation is silent
on possible remedies, while the Commission, when providing reasons, has to specify ‘its legal and political conclusions’
and the ‘actions it intends to take, if any’. This very wide discretion is certainly remindful of (or possibly originates in)
the leeway it enjoys with regard to forwarding (or not) legislative proposals to the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil (when the ordinary legislative procedure applies), and thus it has been observed that the Commission's decision at
the final stage of the ECI is ‘unlikely … [to] be amenable to judicial review’.64 The Commission's conclusions should be
publicly released.65 The decision to grant such leeway to the Commission was effectively agreed during the days of
the Constitutional Convention, when the ECI was included in the text as a last‐minute amendment,66 the rationale
being that the Convention members did not want to introduce a ‘popular legislative initiative’ (that is, a procedure
obliging the Commission to forward the proposal to the EU legislature) without extending this right to the European
Parliament.67 It is not difficult to imagine that, had this proposal been placed on the agenda, the Commission would
not be particularly enthusiastic about ‘sacrificing’ its legislative prerogative, even under the infrequent circumstance
of an ECI that would successfully pass through all the necessary procedural requirements.5 | A CLOSER LOOK INTO THE ECI PROCESS (I ) : THE REGISTRATION AND
THE PERIOD UNTIL THE COMMISSION 'S FINAL DECISION
Clearly, the decision to register or not the proposed initiative further to an examination of the conditions of Article
4(2) of the Regulation is a matter subject to judicial review. To date, the Commission has refused to register 19
proposals,68 while, as will be explained below, in two additional cases the General Court annulled the Commission's61Framework Agreement, above, n. 23, point 16.
62For von Bogdandy, since Art. 2 TEU produces legal consequences, the ‘tenets’ contained therein should be understood as ‘legal
norms and principles, as founding principles’, instead of ‘fundamental ethical convictions’ (values). See Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Founding
Principles’, in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart and Verlag CH Beck, 2011),
11, at 22.
63Dougan, above, n. 5, at 1839.
64Ibid., at 1843.
65Art. 10(2) of Regulation.
66See Art. I‐47(4) of the Constitutional Treaty.
67Sousa Ferro, above, n. 3, at 375.
68See these proposals at: ec.europa.eu/citizens‐initiative/public/initiatives/non‐registered.
258 VOGIATZISrejection, and therefore these two proposals have now been registered on the Commission's website.69 In all of these
cases the Commission did provide reasons (yet unsuccessfully on two occasions, as already noted), while informing
the organisers (under Article 4(3) of the Regulation) of the possibility to contact the Court or the European
Ombudsman. Importantly, in all of these cases the rationale behind the rejection was that the proposed initiative fell
‘manifestly outside the framework of the Commission's powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for
the purpose of implementing the Treaties’.70 The refusal of registration on the basis of lack of Union competence
(instead of the remaining conditions of Article 4(2) of the Regulation) entails that the Court will be called upon to cast
light on the Commission's legal obligations during the registration stage, but perhaps also on the perennial question of
the division of competences between the EU and the Member States.71
The Commission's decision not to register the ‘StopTTIP’ initiative has been widely debated, not least because it
appears that the rejection has, in fact, ‘energised’ the campaign, which used that rejection ‘as a basis to attract
substantial petition signatures’.72 The campaign managed to collect over three million signatures and the organisers
submitted them to the European Parliament ‘demanding a parliamentary hearing on the issue’.73 Eventually, the
General Court annulled the Commission's decision, effectively adopting a broad approach to the term ‘legal act’ as

















76Ibid., p[T]he principle of democracy, … one of the fundamental values of the European Union, as is the objective
specifically pursued by the ECI mechanism, which consists in improving the democratic functioning of the
European Union by granting every citizen a general right to participate in democratic life … requires an
interpretation of the concept of legal act which covers legal acts such as a decision to open negotiations
with a view to concluding an international agreement, which manifestly seeks to modify the legal order
of the European Union.
The Commission's position, according to which it and the Council have sufficient indirect democratic
legitimacy in order to adopt the other legal acts which do not produce legal effects vis‐à‐vis third parties,
has the consequence of limiting considerably recourse to the ECI mechanism as an instrument of
European Union citizen participation in the European Union's normative activity as carried out by means
of the conclusion of international agreements.74In the ‘Minority SafePack’ judgment, the General Court annulled the Commission's decision to refuse the registra-
tion of the ECI on the basis of insufficient reasoning.75 Indeed, the Court expects the Commission to identify which of
the proposed legal acts manifestly fall outside its powers, and to sufficiently substantiate such an assessment.76 Byproposals were the ‘Minority SafePack’ and ‘StopTTIP’. The Commission adopted fresh decisions in order to comply with the
ts of the General Court; thus, these proposals were registered and are currently open for support.
t. 4(2)(b) of Regulation.
not the place to discuss Union competence but see, among others, Loïc Azoulai (ed.), The Question of Competence in the Euro-
ion (Oxford University Press, 2014); Theodore Konstantinidis, Division of Powers in European Union Law: The Delimitation of
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nal, 827, and relevant case‐law discussed in these contributions.
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(2017) 18 European Politics and Society, 166, at 175.
ilian Conrad and Annette Knaut, ‘Bridging the Gap? Concluding Remarks on Various Contributions of the ECI’, in Maximilian
Annette Knaut and Katrin Böttger (eds.), Bridging the Gap? Opportunities and Constraints of the European Citizens' Initiative
2016), 219, at 221.
‐754/14, Efler and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2017:323, paras. 37–38. See, further, Anastasia Karatzia, ‘New Developments
ontext of the European Citizens’ Initiative: General Court Rules on “Stop TTIP”’, available at: eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/
/new‐developments‐in‐context‐of‐european.html.
‐646/13, Bürgerausschuss für die Bürgerinitiative Minority SafePack v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2017:59.
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VOGIATZIS 259contrast, in the earlier case of Anagnostakis, the General Court had decided that the Commission's decision to reject
the registration of the ECI ‘One Million Signatures for a “Europe of Solidarity”’ was justified.77 The Court explained—
with reference to its general case‐law on Article 296 TFEU78—that the statement of reasons must be appropriate to













85Europeclearly indicated that neither the provisions relating to economic and monetary policy to which the
applicant had referred … nor any other legal basis conferred competence on the institution to submit to
the Council … a proposal for an act which would enable the objective of the proposed ECI to be
attained. … The Commission [could not], therefore, be criticised for failing to analyse in detail … the
various [TFEU] provisions … that were referred to in general fashion in the proposed ECI or for merely
observing that those provisions were not relevant.79In Izsák and Dabis, the General Court found that the Commission righty took into account additional submitted
information beyond the requirements of Annex II and Article 4(1) of the ECI Regulation before deciding on registra-
tion.80 Importantly, the General Court confirmed that Article 4(2)(b) of the Regulation should be situated in the
context of the principles of conferral under Article 5(2) TEU and institutional balance under Article 13(2) TEU.81 In
Constantini, and following established case‐law, the General Court held that Article 352 TFEU may be used in the
context of an ECI, but this does not mean that it can serve as a basis for widening the scope of EU powers or
amending the Treaties.82 Thus, ‘the objective of democratic participation of Union citizens underlying the ECI
mechanism cannot frustrate the principle of conferred powers’.83 It therefore appears that the organisers of certain
inadmissible ECIs relied on a broad understanding of the EU's aims or a plethora of legal bases.
Questions of this sort also fall within the remit of the European Ombudsman.84 In essence, the Regulation gives
organisers a choice between the judicial and the extra‐judicial remedy. The Ombudsman's contribution will most likely
be seen, however, during the period between the registration and until the Commission's final decision. Beyond the
Commission's compliance with Article 4(2) of the Regulation, the Ombudsman may therefore examine complaints
on possible delays on the part of the Commission, lack of communication with organisers, transparency matters,
among others. One cannot, of course, predetermine all the areas of possible maladministration that may arise during
this rather complex and lengthy process. In one case the Ombudsman opined that the Commission's decision not to
extend the deadline for the collection of signatures did not constitute maladministration; one should note, however,
that the deadline had already been extended by four additional months and that, in the end, and despite its initial
refusal, the Commission decided to consider the initiative in question (‘Stop Vivisection’, discussed in the next section)
once the threshold had been reached.85 The case was rather exceptional as it occurred during the early stages of the
implementation of the Regulation and the (unavoidable) problems in launching the first ECIs. In forthcoming cases, the‐450/12, Anagnostakis v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:739.
rticle states that ‘[l]egal acts shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals, initiatives, rec-
ations, requests or opinions required by the Treaties’.
stakis, above, n. 77, paras. 28–31.
‐529/13, Izsák and Dabis, ECLI:EU:T:2016:282.
ara. 59.
‐44/14, Contantini v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2016:223, paras. 50–56.
ara. 53.
ue of Art. 228 TFEU, the Ombudsman examines complaints on alleged maladministration or conducts own‐initiative inquiries
o the activities of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Importantly, the Ombudsman does not have the power to
complaints on maladministration against national authorities, even when they are implementing Union law: for example, the
man would declare inadmissible complaints concerning the activities of the national authorities responsible for the verifica-
ignatures of an ECI campaign under Articles 8, 12, 15 of Regulation 211/2011. The Ombudsman's decisions are non‐binding.
an Ombudsman Case 2071/2013/EIS.
260 VOGIATZISargument advanced by the Commission—that granting additional time on an ad hoc basis would be against the
principle of equal treatment between the different initiatives—is reasonable.86
Further issues unravelled via an own‐initiative inquiry on the ECI can concern transparency in funding matters;
the improvement of the online collection system, including the needs of persons with disabilities; and the translation
of the proposal in the official languages of the Union, among others.87 The Ombudsman's general assessment of the
Commission's role in the ECI was not overly critical, especially with regard to the steps taken by the Commission to aid
organisers during the different stages of the procedure (e.g., the Commission provided its own servers for the collec-
tion of signatures). In the same inquiry, regarding the admissibility stage proper, the Ombudsman did encourage the
Commission to ‘provide reasoning for rejecting ECIs that is more robust, consistent and comprehensible to the
citizen’.88 Simultaneously, she noted that the publication of the Commission's reasons on the ECI website is a
‘commendable first step’ serving transparency and enabling public scrutiny.89
So far, and perhaps quite surprisingly, the debate on the ECI has mainly centred on the Commission's stance
during the admissibility stage.90 The point that the Commission's admissibility check, followed by a possible
rejection, could eventually render difficult the generation of certain debates on salient issues91 is, from a participatory‐
democracy perspective, understandable. However, several additional observations can be made in this regard. To begin
with, other participatory instruments have their own limitations, too. For example, the right to petition the Parliament
under Article 227 TFEU concerns a ‘matter which comes within the Union's fields of activity’. In addition, the legal
check at the admissibility stage is not unknown to popular initiatives92 in Member States; by contrast, it ‘is a widespread
pre‐requisite that is commonly commended to administrative or parliamentary bodies’, which do not ‘[judge the]
political opportunity [but] operate on the basis of strict regulatory criteria’.93 Third, the Commission's check does not
or should not include matters such as the ‘unity of subject matter’ as, for example, in Switzerland.94 Fourth, the
Commission's initial idea of a minimum of 300,000 signatures before the consideration of the admissibility question
was eventually dropped.95 Fifth, and more importantly perhaps, the Commission is not immune from scrutiny during
that stage: as shown above, the General Court had no hesitation to annul the Commission's decisions with regard to
the ‘Minority SafePack’ and ‘Stop TTIP’ ECIs.
To recall, the purpose of this article is to assess the role of the Commission in the ECI process, also taking into
account the evolution of European integration, including the Commission's role therein. In this context, although
the Commission's assessment during the admissibility stage on its competence or lack thereof involves some
discretionary appraisal on its part, the author does not believe that the Commission's ex ante control is unnecessary.
Indeed, no convincing reasons exist to give the green light to proposals undermining the EU's values or requesting the
Commission to overstep the existing division of competences. Doing so (e.g., allowing ECIs that would undermine
fundamental human rights, the rule of law or democracy) would obviously go against the constitutionalisation of
the Union and, in addition, the responsibility of the Commission to act as a guardian of the Treaties. It is emphasised
that the judicial and extra‐judicial control that may follow ensures or should ensure that the Commission's powers are86A point the Ombudsman shared; see ibid., point 22.
87See European Ombudsman Case OI/9/2013/TN.
88Case OI/9/2013/TN, point 2 of the ‘Conclusion’.
89Ibid., point 16.
90Compare, e.g., European Parliamentary Research Service, above, n. 2.
91Ibid., at 13–15.
92Although the ECI cannot be classified as a popular initiative, as the proposal will not necessarily be forwarded to the legislature; see
Sousa Ferro, above, n. 3.
93See Víctor Cuesta‐López, ‘A Comparative Approach to the Regulation on the European Citizens’ Initiative’ (2012) 13 Perspectives on
European Politics and Society, 257, at 263.
94Ibid, at 263–264.
95Luis Bouza García, ‘How Could the New Article 11 TEU Contribute to Reduce the EU's Democratic Malaise?’, in Michael Dougan and
Niamh Nic Shuibhne (eds.), Empowerment and Disempowerment of the European Citizen (Hart, 2012), 253, at 268.
VOGIATZIS 261exercised appropriately. To be sure, this contribution does not, of course, claim that the Commission will always ‘get it
right’ (and it is clear by now that on two occasions the Commission's decision was found to be problematic by the
General Court) but that the solution in such cases is not to waive the Commission's control altogether, but rather
to rely (primarily) on the Court to remedy (or not) any possible objections.6 | A CLOSER LOOK INTO THE ECI PROCESS (I I ) : THE COMMISSION 'S
FINAL DECISION
The Commission's decision on the follow‐up to a successful ECI is discretionary, and that discretion is, indeed, very
wide. To date, in three instances96 the Commission provided its legal and political conclusions under Article 10 of
the Regulation. Perhaps the common element in the Commission's response was its reluctance to adhere to the spe-
cific requests of the organisers and, consequently, to forward their proposals to the legislature. The first ECI to meet
the requirements of the Regulation was ‘Right2Water’. The organisers asked the Commission to implement policies
and adopt legislation with a view to ensuring public access to safe drinking water and sanitation.97 The Commission's
initial response was arguably rather vague, primarily focusing on the existing legal framework which might be of rel-
evance to the initiative, but being silent (at the time) on any plans to propose legislation along the aims of the initia-
tive.98 The Commission also refused to pursue further the second ECI, ‘One of Us’, calling for the EU to ‘ban and end
the financing of activities which presuppose the destruction of human embryos’, providing this time a more detailed
and thorough response.99 The third rejection concerned the ECI ‘Stop Vivisection’; the organisers urged the Commis-
sion to abolish the practice of animal experimentation by 2020.100 Despite sharing the organisers' general objectives,
the Commission articulated at length its objections, and promised to undertake actions ‘to accelerate the development
and uptake of non‐animal approaches in research and testing’.101 The quality of the Commission's reasoning is pro-
gressively increasing.
Nonetheless, commentators have observed that the actual level of the Commission's engagement with the afore-
mentioned three proposals has varied. Thus, for the ‘least controversial’ ‘Right2Water’ campaign, the Commission
‘proposed some follow‐up actions’, including an impact assessment, also taking into account the support by the Euro-
pean Parliament.102 Importantly, the Commission removed water services from the Concessions Directive before the
completion of the collection of signatures,103 and stated in its 2017 work programme that it ‘will… come forward with
a legislative proposal on minimum quality requirements for reused water and a revision of the Directive on drinking
water following up on [also]… the’ ECI.104 A fruitful debate was generated at the European Parliament, albeit one with
a dual (and possibly unclear) aim: to ‘hold an expert hearing on the ECI's topic’ and to ‘scrutinise the Commission's
policy in this field’.10596Beyond the Commission's decision not to register the initiative, other possible unsuccessful outcomes for the organisers include the
inability to collect the minimum number of the required signatures or the withdrawal of the proposal by the organisers for various
reasons.
97See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1‐2014‐177‐EN‐F1‐1.Pdf.





102Anastasia Karatzia, ‘The European Citizens’ Initiative and the EU Institutional Balance: On Realism and the Possibilities of Affecting
EU Lawmaking’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review, 177, at 187–190.
103Conrad and Knaut, above, n. 73, at 11.
104Commission Work Programme 2017: Delivering a Europe that Protects, Empowers and Defends (2016) COM(2016) 710 final, at 5.
105Katrin Böttger and Julian Plottka, ‘The ECI—An Overview of Opportunities and Constraints’, in Conrad et al., above, n. 73, 16, at 26.
262 VOGIATZISThe general stance of the Commission vis‐à‐vis the ‘One of Us’ campaign has been characterised as a ‘very polite
justification of why the Commission does not consider any action’,106 namely a polite refusal to engage further with
the aims of the organisers. As Karatzia argues, the driving force behind the Commission's position was that ‘the
two EU co‐legislators had only recently voted for the current legislation’, an argument that the Commission stressed
in its response.107 Still, the initiative ‘stimulat[ed] counter mobilisation’, centring on the possible impact of the proposal
on medical research.108 Insofar as the ‘Stop Vivisection’ campaign is concerned, the Commission underlined ‘the
efficiency of the current legislative framework for the protection of those animals’ but promised some actions, notably
a ‘debate between the scientific community and relevant stakeholders, including the ECI organizers, on developing
alternative methods of experimentation’.109
In this context, the author cannot but subscribe to the view that, overall, and at least on the basis of the existing
sample of successful ECIs available to date, ‘the ECI is not a very successful tool in terms of initiating legislation’.110
This point is returned to below; it is now appropriate to examine the possibilities of control over the Commission's
discretionary decision on the follow‐up to a successful ECI.6.1 | The judicial avenue
The ambit of the Commission's discretion in the final stage of the ECI probably means that such decisions would fall
outside the scope of judicial review.111 Beyond the Court's case‐law on the Commission's legislative initiative
(discussed above), one might also add to the picture the Court's general reluctance to recognise participation rights112
or the uncertainty surrounding the legal nature of the ‘Provisions on Democratic Principles’,113 among which features
the ECI in Article 11(4) TEU. The Court was provided with an opportunity to engage with the democratic principles in
the aforementioned case concerning the faculty of the Commission to withdraw its proposal.114 The Council alleged
that the Commission had failed to respect the principle of representativeness as enshrined in Articles 10(1) and 10(2)
TEU. The Court did not elaborate on this matter, pointing out that since the Commission's power ‘to withdraw a
proposal is inseparable from the right of initiative with which that institution is vested and its exercise is circumscribed
by the provisions of the abovementioned articles of the TEU Treaty, there can be no question, in this instance, of an
infringement of [the principle of democracy]’.115
The General Court is presently examining the Commission's Communication (effectively the rejection) regarding
the ECI ‘One of Us’.116 The first—yet very crucial—question that the Court will have to answer is whether that
communication produces legal effects vis‐à‐vis third parties. In its submissions, the Commission clearly believes that106Ibid.
107Karatzia, above, n. 102, at 192.
108Luis Bouza Garcia and Justin Greenwood, ‘What is a Successful ECI?’, in Conrad et al., above, n. 73, 149, at 165.
109Karatzia, above, n. 102, at 196.
110Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, above, n. 108, at 159.
111Dougan, above, n. 5, at 1843.
112See, e.g., Case C‐104/97 P, Atlanta v. European Community, ECLI:EU:C:1999:498; Case T‐135/96, UEAPME v. Council of the
European Union, ECLI:EU:T:1998:128. Compare also Joana Mendes, ‘Participation and the Role of Law after Lisbon: A Legal View
on Article 11 TEU’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review, 1849.
113It is generally understood that these provisions do not contain subjective rights enforceable in the Court; see, further, Victor Cuesta
Lopez, ‘The LisbonTreaty's Provisions on Democratic Principles: A Legal Framework for Participatory Democracy’ (2010) 16 European
Public Law, 123.
114Council v. Commission, above, n. 19.
115Ibid., para. 96. It is to be noted, though, that the CJEU's decision in Case C‐650/13, Delvigne, ECLI:EU:C:2015:648 on the
restrictions to the right to vote for the European Parliament elections has prompted commentary that the Court is making ‘explicit
the link between EU citizenship and the democratic governance of the EU’; see Koen Lenaerts, ‘Editorial Note: Linking EU Citizenship
to Democracy’ (2015) 11 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, VII, at XIII.
116Case T‐561/14, One of US and Others v. Commission (pending).
VOGIATZIS 263the communication is not an act intended to produce such effects within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU, but ‘an act
of the Commission which reflects only the latter's intention to follow a particular line of conduct’.117 It will be
interesting to see whether the application will pass the admissibility stage, thereby leading the Court to deal with
the applicants' substantive claims (and the Commission's extensive engagement with these claims118).
6.2 | The extra‐judicial avenue: Control by the European Ombudsman
The European Ombudsman could prove a more meaningful avenue to control the Commission's final decision on the
future of the ECI, but under a number of conditions discussed below. As a preliminary remark, it is noted that the
Ombudsman has consistently adopted the position that the notion of maladministration is wider than illegality: what
might escape judicial review may still fall under the Ombudsman's scrutiny.119 As is known, the Ombudsman's
decisions are not legally binding.
The interesting question for present purposes is whether the Ombudsman could apply his or her approach when
overseeing the Commission's role as the guardian of the Treaties (another area where the Commission enjoys, under
the case‐law of the Court, very broad discretion) to the Commission's follow‐up decision within the ECI process. The
stark difference is, of course, that insofar as infringement proceedings are concerned, there is an administrative stage
before litigation, and it was during that administrative stage that the Ombudsman's impact was felt, as will be shown
in a moment. By contrast, the Commission's decision on the follow‐up to an ECI obviously may touch upon the
legislative process, thereby bringing the matter closer to the sphere of political decisions that the Ombudsman will
generally refrain from examining.
In infringement proceedings, the Commission has been criticised for subscribing to ‘elite regulatory bargaining’,
and for being reluctant to expose procedures, negotiations and findings to the public and, more specifically, to
complainants120 (that is, to natural and legal persons approaching the Commission on alleged violations of EU law
by Member States). It was with a view to redressing the disadvantageous position of the individual during the
administrative stage of the infraction process that the Ombudsman decided to accept complaints against the Commis-















tion of EThe Ombudsman can deal with both procedural and substantive aspects of the Commission's treatment of
such cases. With regard to the substantive aspects, the Ombudsman's review aims at verifying whether the
conclusions reached by the Commission are reasonable and whether they are well argued and thoroughly
explained to complainants. With regard to procedural aspects, the main point of reference in the
Ombudsman's inquiries is the Commission's Communication […].122ission's defence in CaseT‐561/14, paras. 17–20. Available at: www.citizens‐initiative.eu/wp‐content/uploads/2015/03/R%
lique‐Commission‐1.pdf.
id., paras. 27–60.
.g., European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2008, at 29.
rd Rawlings, ‘Engaged Elites: Citizen Action And Institutional Attitudes in Commission Enforcement’ (2000) 6 European Law
4.
, above, n. 25, at 788–789. See also European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2008, 29, where the Ombudsman explained that
mission's discretion is confined by—among others—consistency and good faith; proportionality and legitimate expectations;
ntal rights; and non‐discrimination. Unsurprisingly, the Ombudsman's decision to interfere with an area where the Commis-
cleared by the Court to make discretionary decisions was not met (initially, at least) with enthusiasm in Brussels; see, further,
giatzis, ‘Communicating the European Ombudsman's Mandate: An Overview of the Annual Reports’ (2014) 10 Journal of Con-
y European Research, 105, in particular, at 114.
ean Ombudsman, Annual Report 2008, 18–19. The Ombudsman regularly refers to the (now updated) Commission's Commu-
to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Updating the Handling of Relations with the Complainant in Respect of the
ion of Union Law’ COM (2012) 154 final. See, further, Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘The European Ombudsman and the Applica-
U Law by the Member States’ (2008) 1 Review of European Administrative Law, 5, in particular at 13–19.
264 VOGIATZISThe strategic decision of the office to look into the substance of the decision and, in particular, whether the con-
clusions of the Commission are reasonable, well‐argued and thoroughly explained was a bold step, and simultaneously a
choice opening the door for the Ombudsman's scrutiny over the merits of the Commission's handing of complaints of









130EuropTheoretically, [the Ombudsman] examines the way the Commission makes its decision not to bring
infringement proceedings against a member state. Though the control is only about the procedure, it may
radically alter the content of the decision. In fact, the difference between content and form is very difficult
to make out. […] There have been instances when the Ombudsman has accused the Commission of not
having ‘correctly assessed’ the situation before making a decision. He has based his argumentation on the
fact that the Commission examined some arguments and not others. In another case, the Ombudsman
reproached the Commission with having failed to ‘really balance the interests of the opposing parties’.123To return to the role of the Commission in the initiation of legislation, the Ombudsman has generally acknowl-
edged that ‘in evaluating the actions of the Commission in formulating legislative proposals, the Ombudsman's role
is not to substitute his judgement for that of the Commission but to check that correct procedures were followed
and that there was no manifest error of appraisal’.124 Thus, the merits of ‘legislative proposals that are before the Euro-
pean Parliament’ fall outside the scope of maladministration.125 More recently, the Commission questioned the
Ombudsman's competence to examine a delegated act under Article 290 TFEU as the Delegated Regulation in ques-
tion was, according to the Commission, of a ‘quasi‐legislative nature’.126 The Ombudsman, underlining that the
Commission's right to adopt a delegated act determining the non‐essential elements of legislation was unquestion-
able, resolved the matter by pointing out that ‘both branches of the EU legislature [the European Parliament and
the Council] … made the political choice to endorse, either actively or tacitly, the manner in which the Commission
had decided to fill in the details of the relevant legislation in its Delegated Regulation’.127 It was this endorsement that
attributed, according to the Ombudsman, the status of quasi‐legislation to that act, thereby bringing it outside the
scope of the Ombudsman's mandate.128
Moving on to the ECI, in a press release in 2012 the Ombudsman specified that ‘whether the Commission's con-
clusions are reasonable and thoroughly explained’ is something that could fall under the Ombudsman's mandate.129
This is remindful of the Ombudsman's practice vis‐à‐vis the infringement procedure, with the caveat that the ECI pro-
cess has the potential to touch upon legislation. Further, in the abovementioned own‐initiative inquiry, the Ombuds-
man invited the Commission to make the ECI politically salient. To that end, she provided a number of
recommendations: the Commission's political choices should be explained to the public in a detailed and transparent
manner; studies could be carried out and experts could be consulted (often a time‐consuming process, one must
admit); the possible support by the Council and the European Parliament on the proposed initiative could be identified
in advance and, on the basis of the received input, the Commission's position could be reconsidered (this point is
returned to below); its response should be seen as an opportunity for a wider debate, thereby strengthening the Euro-
pean public sphere and democracy at the EU level.130agnette, ‘Between Parliamentary Control and the Rule of Law: The Political Role of the Ombudsman in the European Union’
0 Journal of European Public Policy, 677, at 687.
ean Ombudsman Case 875/2011/JF, point 20.
ean Ombudsman Case 417/2015/NF, point 11.
point 35.
ress Release No. 5/2012, ‘The European Citizens’ Initiative: the Ombudsman is Ready to Help, if Problems Arise’, available at:
budsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/en/11342/html.bookmark.
ean Ombudsman Case OI/9/2013/TN, points 17–24.
VOGIATZIS 265More recently, the Ombudsman has had the opportunity to examine a complaint concerning the Commission's
response to the ‘Stop Vivisection’ ECI.131 The Ombudsman found that the Commission's explanations in the
Communication were not ‘incoherent’, even if in discord with what the organisers were aiming for.132 The Ombudsman
also underlined a number of actions undertaken by the Commission ‘in response to the ECI’, which did not directly
correspond to what the organisers wanted (an immediate end to animal testing), but did demonstrate, according to
the Ombudsman, that the ECI ‘has had an impact on the Commission's actions in this area’.133 Although no maladmin-
istration was identified in this case, the fact that the Ombudsman did examine the substance of the complaint is not an
insignificant development. In fact, and following her recommendations in the aforementioned broader own‐initiative
inquiry, the Ombudsman made it clear in the ‘Stop Vivisection’ complaint that the Commission has a ‘duty to explain,
in a clear, comprehensible and detailed manner, its position and political choices regarding the objectives of the ECI’.134
It follows from the above that while the Ombudsman cannot, of course, review the Commission's political choices
at the follow‐up stage, this does not nonetheless mean that the Ombudsman is not prepared to carefully examine the
detail of the Commission's response and the quality or coherence of its reasons. Whether such extra‐judicial review
will eventually match the ‘reasonableness’ requirement applied in infringement proceedings is a question that cannot
be answered at this stage. The ‘Stop Vivisection’ complaint and the conclusions to the Ombudsman's own‐initiative
inquiry arguably evidence the Ombudsman's belief that ‘the Commission coming forward with a legislative proposal
should not be the only measure of success’.135 Beyond the additional actions that the Commission may take after
the successful collection of signatures,136 more generally and regardless of whether such collection is successful,
‘the process itself is of major significance’.137 In any event, while one should be mindful of the limitations of the
Ombudsman's possible role at the final stage of the ECI, the scrutiny of the Commission's reasons not only leaves
the door open for a more substantive review, but admittedly is also something that the organisers might not achieve
if they choose the judicial avenue.1386.3 | Political control: The limited role of the European Parliament
The very limited role of the European Parliament in the ECI process cannot remain unnoticed. The European
Parliament is only responsible for organising a hearing after the collection of signatures.139 The Ombudsman—perhaps
quite optimistically—believes that the hearing is a marvellous opportunity for a political debate and ‘democracy in
action’, and has (rightly) invited the Commission to ensure that the two arms of the EU legislature, the Council and
the European Parliament, take part therein.140 The hearing is organised by the legislative committee responsible for
the subject matter of the ECI, in collaboration with the Petitions' Committee,141 and is an opportunity for the
organisers to liaise with the Commission, the European Parliament, and other institutions or stakeholders, but does
not ensure an ex‐post review of the Commission's final decision, given that the latter is provided after the hearing.131European Ombudsman Case 1609/2016/JAS.
132Ibid., points 14–15.
133Ibid., point 18.
134Ibid., point 22 (emphasis added).
135Case OI/9/2013/TN, point 20.
136Case 1609/2016/JAS, point 18.
137Case OI/9/2013/TN, point 20.
138Beyond the pending One of Us case, above, n. 116, see also the Court's restrictive approach concerning the scope of the right to
petition the Parliament in Case C‐261/13 P, Schönberger v. European Parliament ECLI:EU:C:2014:2423.
139See Art. 11 of Regulation.
140Case OI/9/2013/TN, point 22.
141Rule 211 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/sipade/rulesleg8/Rulesleg8.
EN.pdf.
266 VOGIATZISRule 218 of Parliament's procedural rules leaves more room for (indirect) political control. It states that the
Petitions' Committee may follow up an ECI (drafting an own‐initiative report) which had been registered but did
not manage to meet the requirements of the Regulation. This seems logical as each ECI signature could also have been
registered as a separate petition. This can also apply to the Commission's final decision: nothing prevents the
committee responsible for the subject matter of the ECI from exercising pressure upon the Commission when it
believes that the organisers and signatories have a case worth pursuing. The own‐initiative report may lead to the
activation of Article 225 TFEU, Parliament's faculty to propose legislation to the Commission.142 In fact, the European
Parliament committees for environment and development produced reports criticising the Commission's
unwillingness to propose legislation on the basis of the ‘Right2Water’ ECI.1437 | SHOULD THE COMMISSION ENJOY VERY BROAD DISCRETION AT THE
FOLLOW‐UP STAGE OF THE ECI?
This article argues that the debate on the ECI should shift towards the final stage of the process, when the Commis-
sion makes a decision as to whether or not the proposal will be forwarded to the EU legislature. This inevitably brings
to the fore the desirable ambit of discretion that the Commission should enjoy therein. Undeniably, the Commission's
prerogative to initiate legislation is constitutionally guaranteed under Article 17 TEU, and the case‐law of the Court
does not seem to indicate that such discretion can be seriously qualified. However, if the role of the Commission is
assessed in light of the broader political and social context of European integration, then the answer becomes less
straightforward. Likewise, if normative reasons for strengthening participatory or direct democracy within the EU
are considered, then the Commission's power to reject the voice of at least one million citizens becomes somewhat
problematic.
As an initial observation, if one considers the Commission's two main decisions within the ECI process, one
cannot then expect the Commission to accept everything at the registration stage, and then merely forward the
proposals to the legislature when (or shortly after) presenting its conclusions. This is not realistic and it would probably
be undesirable, too. Now, to assume that a relaxed degree of scrutiny, on the part of the Commission, at the
registration stage, coupled with the Commission's existing broad discretion at the last stage, will boost the democratic
prospects of the ECI is a very optimistic hypothesis which does not (sufficiently) take into account that a rejected ECI
on the basis of Article 10 of the Regulation is likely to disappoint citizens and civil society organisations, and
eventually undermine the overall effectiveness of the instrument. There is a widespread conclusion now that the
ECI ‘does not work’,144 and even more optimistic accounts recognise that the number of requests for registration with
the Commission has recently declined:145 is this because the Commission has been overly strict during the
admissibility stage or because there is no mechanism to control the Commission's decision during the final stage of
the process?
Legally, of course, plausible reasons exist to preserve Article 10 of the Regulation in its present form, including the
formulation under Article 11(4) TEU that citizens can invite the Commission to submit a proposal; it is indeed
questionable whether the Regulation could go significantly further.146 Likewise, and without pre‐empting the Court's142The own‐initiative reports are produced in accordance with Rule 52 of Parliament's Rules on Procedure; see also Rule 46 on Art.
225 TFEU.
143See Report of 15 July 2015 on the follow‐up to the European Citizens' Initiative Right2Water (2014/2239(INI)). To that end, a Res-
olution was adopted by the European Parliament in support of the organisers' claims; see European Parliament Resolution of 8
September 2015 on the follow‐up to the European Citizens' Initiative Right2Water (2014/2239(INI)).
144See a collection of essays, ‘An ECI that Works! Learning from the First TwoYears of the European Citizens’ Initiative’ (2014), avail-
able at: ecithatworks.org.
145Conrad and Knaut, above, n. 73, at 222.
146Andreas Auer, ‘The European Citizens’ Initiative’ (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review, 79, at 83.
VOGIATZIS 267answer to this question, it is difficult to see how the Court will find that the Commission's explanations—for example—
to the three abovementioned successful ECIs do not meet the Commission's reason‐giving requirements.
Conversely, the Commission is not expected to provide insufficient (from the point of view of judicial review, even
assuming that such ‘decision’ is reviewable) reasoning when rejecting an ECI, and even more so since the
Commission now knows that the Ombudsman is willing to examine complaints of this sort (yet under the
abovementioned limitations).
However compatible with theTreaties and the CJEU's case‐law, the Commission's possible unwillingness to even
partially sacrifice its legislative prerogative cannot be immune from scrutiny. Of relevance here is the Commission's
response to the ‘green card’ by national parliaments on food waste.147 Sixteen national parliaments invited the
Commission ‘when tabling a new circular economy package, to adopt a strategic approach to the reduction of food











(Oxford[they did] not seek to infringe upon the Commission's right of initiative, but to complement it; nor [did they]
seek to challenge the existing role of the European Parliament, or the duties of the co‐legislators in agreeing
legislation. But … given that 16 national parliaments and chambers have come together in support of this
proposal … the Commission should give it due weight, and respond appropriately.148The Commission committed itself to duly consider the proposals, but simultaneously underlined that ‘as the
circular economy package [was] under preparation and [had] yet to be discussed by the College, it [was] not possible
at [that] stage to comment on specific initiatives’ that could be included in the package.149
The CJEU's views on the Commission's power to withdraw a proposal certainly demonstrate that (under some
constraints—e.g. the reason‐giving requirements) the Commission ‘does not cease to act in the EU interest after it
submits the proposal’.150 But more interesting, perhaps, is the Commission's own view on this matter: the latter
believes that ‘its right to withdraw a proposal is the corollary to its right of initiative. Withdrawal must therefore be
guided by the same criterion as the exercise of its right of initiative, i.e. the Community interest’.151 The Commission's
views withstanding, the earlier discussion sought to explain that throughout the evolution of the Union the
Commission's prerogative has been confined (with some commentators even observing that co‐decision has had a
detrimental impact upon the Commission's ‘control over the legislative process’, and notably its power to withdraw
proposals152), while the assumption that it always acts on behalf of the Union interest is an oversimplification.
Moreover, convincing normative reasons exist to increase the EU's legitimacy via participation and, consequently,
via a stronger ECI. These arguments will be considered in turn.
In light of the Commission's limited legitimacy, reducing the scope of the Commission's discretion when present-
ing its conclusions would increase input legitimacy,153 and would render the ECI closer to a direct democracy EU
instrument. One should also consider whether a pan‐European debate is more likely to be generated if the
Commission actually forwards certain proposals to the EU legislature, which simultaneously means that such matters
will be further discussed within the European Parliament and the Council, the two institutions representing directlyood Waste: A Proposal by National Parliaments to the European Commission’ (2015), available at: www.parliament.uk/doc-
lords‐committees/eu‐select/green‐card/green‐card‐on‐food‐waste.pdf.
t 1. Much of the discussion on national parliaments has focused on Protocol No. 2 of the LisbonTreaty, and their role in mon-
e subsidiarity principle. This matter falls outside the scope of the present contribution.
he Commission's response of 17 November 2015, at: www.parliament.uk/documents/lords‐committees/eu‐select/green‐
Commission‐response‐to‐HoL.PDF.
on, above, n. 19, at 908.
fn 46, citing the Commission's answer to MEP Herman [1987] OJ C220/7. In the recent Council v. Commission case, the Court
d that the Commission's power ‘to withdraw a proposal is inseparable from the right of initiative’ (above, n. 114).
é, above, n. 37, at 36–37.
e classic distinction between input and output legitimacy, see Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?
University Press, 1999).
268 VOGIATZISand indirectly European citizens.154 In addition, the Commission's legislative prerogative is grounded, among others, in
a perception that the Commission represents the Union interest. If such representation of the ‘common good’ often
becomes questionable, it is less clear on which normative basis the Commission will reject the ECI. The choice of at
least one fourth of Member States was based precisely on the tenet that such composition of the proposal would suf-
ficiently represent the Union interest.155 Now, nothing prevents the European Parliament and the Council from acti-
vating Articles 225 and 241 TFEU respectively, with a view to forwarding a proposal to the Commission when the
latter decides to remain inactive; in fact, this might be a necessary compromise between the simultaneous presence
of the principles of representation and participation in the EU Treaty.156 One should not forget that even if the Com-
mission forwards the proposal, this does not entail that the initiative will be passed by the two institutions. Impor-
tantly, in light of the ‘dual representation’ basis under which the EU operates, and regarding a controversial ECI
that has to be rejected, it would be preferable if such rejection (or modification) would stem from the institutions
representing citizens at the national/EU level.
In addition, compelling normative considerations suggest that increasing participation in the EU would entail gains
in legitimacy. Participation supplements representative democracy as ‘those affected by policy are able to directly take
part in issue‐specific policy processes’ without anticipating the next general election to hold the government to
account.157 Turning to the EU, due to its ‘size, diversity, distance between elected politicians and citizens, and […]
the very institutional complexity of the Union’, the EU has to rely also on participation to complement representa-
tion.158 Thus, the latter's legitimacy is a matter of democratic legitimacy: ‘the constitutional identity of both the Union
and its member states is premised on the coupling of legitimacy and democracy’.159 This is all the more important as
the evolution of the Union into a polity with particular features entails that ‘the democratic quality of the EU’ can
no longer be perceived to ‘derive from the democratic quality of the member states’, and so the ‘indirect model of
legitimisation is inadequate’.160 From a technocratic organisation seeking to complete the internal market, the EU
has evolved into an autonomous order in need to improve its democratic performance and relate with citizens.
Besides, participation strengthens the European public sphere and the European demos.161 In this context, the ECI
brings to the fore very powerfully the role of the Commission because, no matter how restrained its design through
primary and—importantly—secondary law is, the very idea of involving citizens directly in the decision‐making process
has a clear aim to improve (to the degree that they can be improved via the ECI process) the EU's democratic
credentials.
The above should not be read as implying that the Commission's legislative prerogative has lost its constitutional
significance, and therefore a revised ECI Regulation should straightforwardly re‐write Article 10 and disregard the EU154The equal weight of the Council and the European Parliament under the ordinary legislative procedure is a reflection of the EU's
dual basis of legitimacy under Article 10 TEU; see Michael Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’ (2008)
45 Common Market Law Review, 617, at 639–640.
155European Commission, ‘Green Paper on a European Citizens’ Initiative’, COM (2009) 622 final, p. 4. Note that the Commission's
initial proposal was a higher threshold, namely one‐third of Member States.
156Dougan, above, n. 5, at 1843–1844.
157Beate Kohler‐Koch and Christine Quittkat, De‐mystification of Participatory Democracy: EU Governance and Civil Society (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2013), at 1.
158Mendes, above, n. 112, at 1858.
159Agustín José Menéndez, ‘The European Democratic Challenge: The Forging of a Supranational Volonté Générale’ (2009) 15 Euro-
pean Law Journal, 277, in particular at 280.
160Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez, ‘Introduction: A Constitution in the Making?’, in Erik Oddvar
Eriksen, John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez (eds.), Developing a Constitution for Europe (Routledge, 2004), at 6. After all,
ministerial participation in the Council meetings should not be taken for granted; see an interesting study in Caroline Howard Grøn
and Heidi Houlberg Salomonsen, ‘Who's at the Table? An Analysis of Ministers’ Participation in EU Council of Ministers Meetings'
(2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy, 1071.
161Elizabeth Monaghan, ‘Assessing Participation and Democracy in the EU: The Case of the European Citizens’ Initiative’ (2012) 13
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 285, at 295.
VOGIATZIS 269Treaties. Rather, it is submitted that the lack of thorough debate on the Commission's role at the final stage of the ECI
sticks overly to the Treaty text and the longstanding axioms concerning the Commission's institutional role. Insuffi-
cient attention is being paid to the evolution of European integration, and especially to the Commission's role therein.
And yet the surrounding institutional reality suggests that, for better or worse, the Commission's legislative preroga-
tive is progressively fading. Further, despite recent (and welcome) efforts to involve the European Parliament under
Article 17(7) TEU, the Commission is still being perceived as insufficiently accountable. Thus, the debate on the
Commission's role within the ECI does not duly consider the perennial discussion on the democratic deficit and the
need to complement representation with meaningful instruments of participatory or direct democracy. Simply put:
the discrepancy between the law (and especially the Treaties) and the established institutional practice in the EU is,
without doubt, substantial.
In this context, if reasons exist to involve the supranational voice at the final stage of the ECI process, then it is
essential to reflect on the possible instruments that will ensure that the Commission actually promotes the general
interest of the EU when making such discretionary decision. One possible avenue to increase the level of political
scrutiny could be via the involvement of the European Parliament. In its Resolution, the latter underlined ‘its concerns
about a potential conflict of interest, given that the Commission itself has the exclusive responsibility to carry out the
admissibility check, and asks that this situation be properly addressed in the future’.162
In the author's view, particularly attractive are claims that the Commission should be politically encouraged to give
successful initiatives ‘a de facto mandatory force in terms of bringing forward proposals for Union action even when
they are manifestly against its own political agenda’.163 This is a plausible way to increase the ECI's politicisation and
salience. In such a scenario, the proposal itself would be subject to the laborious negotiations between the Parliament
and the Council (when the ordinary legislative procedure applies), and the argument can be made that because of their
increased legitimacy, these institutions are better placed than the Commission to reject an otherwise controversial
proposal stemming from an ECI.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman's own‐initiative inquiry interestingly pointed out that the Commission could gauge
the possible support by the Council and the European Parliament on the proposed initiative before reaching a
conclusion.164 To date, nonetheless, the Commission has not undertaken such a political commitment. One could
even speculate that even the slightest ‘sacrifice’ of its legislative prerogative (slightest in the sense that the formalities
of the ECI Regulation render the collection of the necessary level of support an uncommon scenario) would be too
high a ‘price’ to be paid by the Commission, despite the obvious gains in legitimacy and participation that such a stance
would entail. Because the available sample consists of three (successful) ECIs, it is acknowledged that only time will
tell whether the Commission is indeed prepared (or not) to partially compromise, where appropriate, its monopoly
to initiate legislation.
The author submits, therefore, that the Commission enjoys too broad a discretion at the final stage of the ECI.
While this may be legally explainable, politically it cannot be easily justified. Further political or quasi‐judicial scrutiny
is necessary in order to ensure that the Commission indeed serves the EU interest. Alternatively, and perhaps prefer-
ably, pressure should be exercised upon the Commission in order for the latter to de facto accept to forward the pro-
posal to the EU legislature or to undertake a commitment to do so if there is foreseeable support by the European
Parliament and the Council. The optimist would believe the Commission when explaining that it has the best of inten-
tions to strengthen the ECI as a tool of political participation and a means to fulfil the perennial promise of bringing
citizens closer to the EU.165 In order for the Commission to convince the cynic, however, it will need to engage in162European Parliament's Resolution, above, n. 7, point 13. In the same Resolution (point 14) the European Parliament ‘call[ed] on the
the Commission … to consider Parliament also as a decision‐maker, particularly because it is the only institution the members of which
are directly elected by EU citizens’.
163Bouza García, above, n. 95, at 274–275.
164See above, n. 130.
165See the Commission's three‐year Report on the ECI, further to Article 22 of Regulation 211/2011; European Commission, ‘Report
on the Application of Regulation (EU) No. 211/2011 on the Citizens’ Initiative’ (2015) COM(2015) 145 final.
270 VOGIATZISan open dialogue about the final stage of the ECI, which so far appears to be a very delicate issue. Regardless of how
much credit the Commission should (indeed) take for helping organisers until the follow‐up stage and within a complex
legal framework under the ECI Regulation, what is does next with the proposal is simply too critical an issue to be left
unaddressed.8 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper assessed the institutional position of the Commission in the ECI process from a legal perspective, but also
from the perspective of the evolution of European integration. It found that the Court is more likely to be involved (and
has indeed been involved) as a control mechanism at the registration stage, particularly with regard to respect of the
Union's competences. By contrast, the EU judge may not be expected to thoroughly scrutinise the Commission's
stance under Article 10 of the Regulation. Regarding the extra‐judicial avenue, the Ombudsman could scrutinise the
quality of the Commission's reasoning at the follow‐up stage, also relying on the right to participate in the democratic
life of the Union under Article 10(3) TEU. The difference with the method applied in infringement proceedings is that in
the latter case the Commission's role clearly pertains to its administrative activities. Further, only indirectly can the
European Parliament and the Council intervene and follow up an unsuccessful ECI, through their constitutional
prerogatives under Articles 225 and 241 TFEU.166 Otherwise, the European Parliament hosts and participates in the
hearing of the ECI organisers but ultimately cannot limit the Commission's discretion within the ECI process.
This contribution also situated the provisions of the ECI in the context of the evolution of European integration
and the Commission's role therein. Particular emphasis was placed on the persistent issue of the legitimacy of a non‐
representative, supranational institution, the developments in the area of initiation of legislation, the ‘representation
of Union interest’ claim and the transformation of the Union into a particular constitutional project. Viewed from this
perspective, the Commission's role at the admissibility stage is arguably compatible with the constitutionalisation of
the Union. The same cannot be said, however, with regard to the Commission's leeway at the follow‐up stage, which
is open to criticism on a number of grounds (all going beyond theTreaty text and the case‐law of the EU courts, which
indeed preserve the Commission's discretion in initiating legislation). Pragmatically, the Commission is now infre-
quently the initiator of legislation;167 and the latter cannot always be deemed to act on behalf of the Union interest.
Insofar as the Commission's right of initiative is concerned, the discrepancy between the text of the EU Treaties
and the institutional reality should concern commentators, unless, of course, it is (perhaps lightheartedly) agreed that
in the present challenging state of the Union when the legitimacy question is particularly pertinent, the ultimate pri-
ority should be to—always and at any cost—safeguard the Commission's prerogative. In fact, after the result of the UK
referendum, and in light of the EU's need to re‐think its focus and connect with citizens, some commentators have
opined that the ‘time has come to think seriously about passing the right of initiative from the Commission to the
European Parliament and reinforcing the citizens’ initiative’.168 To return to the scope of the present contribution,
as things stand the Commission controls both the admissibility and the final stage, has generally improved the quality
of its reasoning at the follow‐up stage and to its credit assists the organisers during the collection period by providing
resources and expertise.169 Nonetheless, after more than four years since the entry into force of Regulation 211/
2011,170 the first signs demonstrate that, in the near future, the scenario of an ECI being transferred as such to the166See, further, Dougan, above, n. 5, at 1843–1844.
167For evidence on this compare, e.g., the empirical work of Ponzano et al., above, n. 37, at 13 et seq.
168Anthony Arnull, ‘Broken Bats’ (2016) 41 European Law Review, 473, at 474.
169As the Commission's three‐year Report illustrates (above, n. 165), the Commission collaborates with Europe Direct to answer a
plethora of queries throughout (or even before the commencement of) the ECI process. More recent developments include the pos-
sibility of the creation of a collaborative online platform, potentially to be run by both the Commission and NGOs, with a view to pro-
viding advice on the organisation of ECIs; see www.citizens‐initiative.eu/survey‐collaborative‐platform‐european‐citizens‐initiative.
170The Regulation entered into force on 1 April 2012.
VOGIATZIS 271EU legislature is rather remote. To be fair to the Commission, a sample of three ECIs is not sufficient in itself to pro-
vide definitive conclusions on this point. Still, a situation whereby Article 11(4) TEU and the Regulation 211/2011 or
its future revised version will essentially turn into dead letter has to be avoided.
The ongoing concern, if not widespread sense of disappointment, about the direction of the instrument within the
advocates of the ECI and—more generally—proponents of participatory or even direct democracy in the EU can hardly
remain unnoticed. Even if the status quo guarantees the Commission's constitutional prerogatives, one question that
should be reflected upon is whether the consistent refusal to forward proposal(s) to the EU legislature further under-
mines the Commission's legitimacy—and the same applies, of course, to the legitimacy of the EU as a whole.171
Proposals inviting the Commission to de facto accept successful ECIs172 or base its action on the possible support
of the co‐legislators173 (and undertake a general and explicit political commitment to doing so, this account adds)
arguably reflect a plausible balance between, on the one hand, the available legal framework and, on the other, the
existing institutional practice, as well as the need to render instruments of participatory democracy in the EU more
salient.
If eventually the Commission proves unwilling to forward any ECIs to the EU legislature, can it really be excluded
that a possible revision of Article 11(4) TEU174 will one day be seriously considered?175 Instead of thinking of treaty
revision and its challenges, however (in the case of several further ‘unsuccessful’ ECIs), it is hoped that there is still
time for the Commission to adopt a more accommodating approach to this matter, and take steps with a view to dem-
onstrating that in practice it is prepared within the ECI process and where appropriate to ‘sacrifice’ its legislative
prerogative.
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